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Pursuant to Rule 24(d) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellee Trustco, Inc.
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"TIE" or "Farmers"
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"Safeco"

Appellee American States Insurance Company

"American States"
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Appellee Stephen D. Kirchen

"Kirchen"

Appellees Central Bonds & Insurance Agency, Inc. and Central Bonds
and Insurance Company

"Central Bonds"

Appellees Blackburn Jones and Company and E. Kent Jones . . "Blackburn Jones"
Appellees Trinity Universal Insurance Company of Kansas, Inc. and
Trinity Unitrin Property & Casualty Insurance Group
"Trinity"
Appellee Auto Owners Insurance Company
"Auto Owners" or "Owners"
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S T A T E M E N T SHOWING JURISDICTION
1 in. i i.iii I ouri ol" Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated
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STATEM E NT O F ISSJ JES

1.

Did. the trial coi irt properly grant Trustee)'s motion 'for summary

judgmei it, wl ler € I i i istco succe.vsiLiv . .-u/.vi * AW . J .* > i-.ui.s= > quoicd saiixw n^urance
CON C r . i P C ?

2.

Did the trial court properly deny Farr's motion for partial summary

judgment against Trustco, where Fair received the insurance coverage Reed requested on
Fan "'s bel lalf?
Standard of Review: The appellate court will review

'*

l

'•

decision to grant summary judgment for correctness, affording the trial court no deference.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and
tl: le i ! it. :) vat ig pai 1 y is ei ititled t : ji idgii ic i it as a i i: latter of la \ v C "- est woot i Co i }e Apt u in iei its
Business Trust v. Turner, 2007 U I 48, 164 P.3d 1247.
Farr preserved these issues on appeal. (R , 3 4 9 7 - o 15)
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'I 'here are i IOCOI istiti ltioi ialpro\ isioi is,stati ites,ordii lai ices,i i llesoi regi llations
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This lawsuit arises from a May 29,2003 incident at an ice cream "cold storage

warehouse" located in Salt Lake City, Utah owned by plaintiff Asael Farr & Sons Company
("Farr"). Farr alleges an electric condenser fan motor accidentally sheared off its mount and
severed an ammonia line, releasing ammonia which contaminated Farr's ice cream product
and rendering the product unmarketable. At the time of the loss, Farr was insured with
Safeco Insurance Company ("Safeco") and Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance
Company ("Hartford"). Because the insurance coverage with Safeco and Hartford was
insufficient to cover the damages allegedly sustained in the loss, Farr seeks additional
damages from a broad array of insurers, agents and brokers.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below.
After extensive discovery, all defendants filed motions for summary judgment

and Farr filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The district court granted all
defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied Farr's motion for partial summary
judgment.
C.

Statement of Relevant Facts1
1.

Duane Farr, as Farr's general manager, had the most involvement with

1

The following facts are pertinent to that portion of the trial court's June 15, 2007 Order
granting Trustco's Motion for Summary Judgment, and denying Farr's Motion for Summary
Judgment against Trustco.
2

procuring the insurance at issue in this case. (R 2522)
2.

D u a n e Farr w a s invoKcu »\iii. pt\ . u n n g i arr's insurance U). . A C . -

fi/v < :1 <. )1 1: ;ii: 1 ;; > ;; /( ; ir j: )t i, y I 1 1 i I\ 1; i;; < 29. 2003 ; u xi< h ;i it (R 2S?"^?T>
3.

D u r i n g that time, D u a n e Farr utilized " m a n ) brokers.' < \< '.! : ^

4.

F o r t h e policy year preceding t h e loss (i.e.. M a y 14. 2 0 0 ? to -hi; 1,

\ IM,' * t. j nrr w a s insured by Defei idai it I i ii lit} ' ! Jni v ei sal Ii isi irai ice Coi i ipai v > • : Ill: Kai isas
\ '- •-'••

f
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"h H!;vi.b- snJonesComnam {"BlackburnJones").

(R. 1425; 1445-51)
5.
oi \::N

••

The equipment breakdown coverage in 11 inii\ * pwiiL\ p o - u\ ; a unit
• cuiLic \

]

: "> ^x

6.

ss of pei isi lablegood-

.,...;,.,

\

i u- '^
In March 2003, Trinity notified Farr that the Trinity policy would not

be renewed and Farr's coverage woi ild cease on May 14, ..!()()'» I K 1 I ! N, I IJ'Mli)
7.

•

•

replacement insurance covenme for the expinim
8.

!

t

, .

h

.

.

l g

naity policy (R. 1431)

D u a n e Farr coniacted or was contacted by several insurance agents to

pro\ u k i-ki> on i an . insurance. *
9.

• • > , . ,

I)

)
* -1 " ' I O ' - O :IV»(M

"..r

'• . i b i - r ' * J ic c » u e ' ' a i ? e

and limits of the expiring' 1 rinity policy, as Mr. Farr wanted to compare "apples to apples."
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This information included the $25,000 limit for the loss of Farr's perishable goods resulting
from a release of ammonia. (R. 1440-41)
10.

Farr subsequently received several bids for insurance coverage from

various agents, including a proposal from Defendant Andrew Reed ("FLeed") on behalf of
Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE")- (R- 1431-32)
11.

Also among those proposals was one from Blackburn Jones on behalf

of Safeco.2 That bid, however, was rejected by Farr because it was received after the
deadline imposed by Dexter Farr. (R. 1435-37)
12.

During Farr's efforts to replace its insurance coverage, Reed, a TIE

captive agent, met in person with Duane Farr. (R. 750-53)
13.

TIE provided workers compensation coverage for Farr, and Reed

wanted to obtain all of Farr's insurance business. Id.
14.

Reed suggested an increase in Farr's spoilage coverage limit, but Duane

Farr rejected any increase above the coverage limit that had been in place during the previous
year. (R. 1726-27)
15.

Reed subsequently discovered that TIE would not write the coverage

for Farr that Reed requested. (R. 779)

defendants Safeco Insurance Company and American States Insurance Company are
referred to interchangeably in the insurance industry as "Safeco." (R. 2532) The two companies
will be referred to collectively as "Safeco."
4

16.

Reed, as a captive agent for Farmers, was required to attempt placement

of Farr's coverage with TIE. Once TIE declined Farr's coverage, Reed became free to shop
around with other insurers in an attempt to place Farr's business. (R. 768)
17.

Reed attempted unsuccessfully to place Farr's property coverage with

Auto-Owners Insurance, using agent Steve Kirchen. When Auto Owners declined coverage,
Kirchen contacted Trustco principal Troy Granger on Reed's behalf. (R. 1841-2; 1855-57)
18.

Kirchen knew that Trustco was an agent of Safeco, and that Safeco had

prepared a previous coverage quote for Farr in conjunction with Blackburn Jones. (R. 185557)
19.

On May 23,2003, Reed informed Duane Farr that Farr had no property,

liability or equipment breakdown insurance in place. (R. 2527)
20.

Duane Farr first became aware of Trustco on May 23, 2003, six days

prior to the accident at issue in this case. When asked at his deposition who Trustco was,
Duane Farr stated: "I'm assuming it's just an agent here in Salt Lake. I don't know. Haven't
been involved with them." (R. 2524)
21.

Duane Farr further testified about his understanding of Trustco's

involvement:
Q.

Did you ask Mr. Reed what insurer would be
involved now that Trustco was entering the
picture?

A.

I thought it was Trustco. I didn't know who it
was.
5

Q.

Did you assume that Trustco was an insurance
company?

A.

I didn't know who Trustco was.

Q.

So is it fair to say you didn't have any idea of
what their role was in this whole thing?

A.

Not really.

Q.

And you just assume [sic] that Mr. Reed knew
what he was talking about.

A.

I did.

Q.

And you relied on his directions to you about
signing that letter.

A.

I did. Yeah.

Q.

You never had any direction communications
with Trustco or anyone at Trustco.

A.

I don't recall having any.

Q.

To this day?

A.

To this day.

(R. 2525-26)
22.

Trustco first became aware of Farr's insurance needs on May 23,2003,

the day Duane Farr signed a "broker of record" letter. The broker of record letter stated:
Please acknowledge Trustco, Inc. as our exclusive Broker of
Record to handle all the affairs associated in the writing of our
policy. We would like to have coverage bound effective today
May 23, 2003. Therefore we would ask that you release all
information and quotes to Trustco, Inc. as soon as possible.
6

We ask that you waive the ten (10) day waiting period as no
rescinding letter will be submitted.
(R. 1667,2538)
23.

Trustco principal Troy Granger kept the following notes about what

occurred on May 23, 2003:
Got phone call from Steve Kirchen. "How would you like to
have a $50,000 acct. dropped in your lap?" "It has to be done
today." I stayed in town and got it done. We did [a broker of
record] letter and I talked to [Safeco employee] Chatrice, she
confirmed she got it. I asked her about coverage being bound
and she said it was. I told her to go with all coverages except
auto as they had gone to Farmers with auto.
(R. 2538)
24.

At this time, Granger understood that "the whole [Farr] account had

been quoted by Safeco through another [Blackburn Jones] agent." For that reason, Granger
believed that Trustco's only task was to obtain the broker of record letter and bind the
previously-quoted Safeco coverage. (R. 2531-32)
25.

At all times pre-loss, Reed understood Granger and Trustco were relying

on him to convey to Trustco what Farr wanted in terms of insurance coverage. (R. 2541)
26.

Granger had the same understanding:
Q.

So you didn't feel that there was any need to
review coverages with the Farrs directly because
of what you've testified to here. Right?

A.

It was made clear that was not to be my role. That
was to be Andrew [Reed's] role, and I relied on

7

Andrew to get that information to me. That's
correct.
Q.

You never met with the Farrs?

A.

Never met with the Farrs.

(R. 2535-36)
27.

Without explaining Trustco's role in obtaining insurance coverage, Reed

instructed Duane Farr to sign the letter appointing Trustco as Farr's broker of record. The
letter stated that Farr "would like to have coverage bound effective today May 23, 2003...."
(R. 1667,2528)
28.

Trustco bound the previously-quoted Safeco coverage for Farr on March

23,2003. (R. 1908,2538)
29.

As with the prior year Trinity policy, Safeco's policy provided

equipment breakdown coverage for the loss of perishable goods due to contamination from
the release of ammonia with a limitation of $25,000. (R. 1463-1468)
30.

Safeco has paid Farr the $25,000 policy limit for ammonia

contamination of Farr's product. (R. 1470-72)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Farr's Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") asserts negligence, breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable estoppel claims against Trustco, based on

8

Trustco's alleged failure to ensure that Farr had adequate insurance coverage. 3 Trustco was
not asked to review Farr's coverage, and had no independent duty to do so. Trustco did what
it was asked to do: bind the previously-quoted Safeco coverage on May 23,2003. Due to the
limited scope of Trustco's involvement, Farr's direct claims against Trustco fail as a matter
of law. Farr also seeks to impute liability to Trustco for Reed's alleged acts or omissions,
claiming that Reed was Trustco's subagent. That claim fails as well, because the undisputed
facts show Reed was not authorized to act on Trustco's behalf, and was not subject to control
by Trustco.
ARGUMENT
I.

TRUSTCO IS NOT LIABLE TO FARR, BECAUSE TRUSTCO
PERFORMED AS REQUESTED
Farr alleges Trustco failed to obtain certain insurance coverage for Farr, and

should therefore be held liable for Farr's alleged damages.

The trial court correctly

dismissed Farr's claims against Trustco with prejudice, because Trustco's pre-loss
involvement was limited to obtaining previously-quoted coverage for Farr. Trustco did not
undertake an independent investigation of Farr's insurance needs, and had no duty to do so.
A.

Farr's Negligence Claim Fails Because Trustco Had No Duty to Obtain
Additional Coverage for Farr
Courts require special circumstances before an insurance agent will owe an

3

The TAC also includes causes of action entitled "'Bad Faith" (Count III), and
"Declaratory Relief (Count V). These claims are either redundant or derivative of Farr's other
claims, and are not addressed separately herein.
9

insured a duty to obtain adequate coverage. Trustco had no direct dealings with Farr prior
to the May 29, 2003 accident.

Trustco worked solely through Reed in binding the

previously-quoted Safeco coverage.

Reed never requested that Trustco review Farr's

coverage. Accordingly, Trustco owed no duty to obtain additional coverage for Farr's
potential losses due to ammonia leaks.
Although Utah courts have not specifically analyzed an insurance agent's duty
to procure adequate coverage, Utah courts have analyzed an agent's duty to procure
insurance. In Harris v. Albrecht, 86 P.3d 728 (Utah 2004), a client brought negligence
claims against an insurance agent for the agent's alleged failure to procure insurance before
a fire destroyed the client's business. The Utah Supreme Court held that an insurance agent
does not have a duty to procure insurance unless: (1) an agent accepts an application; (2)
makes a bare acknowledgment of a contract covering a specific kind of casualty; (3) lulls the
other party into believing a contract has been effected through promises; and (4) has taken
care of the insured's needs without consultation in the past. Id. at 735.
Analogizing to Harris, Trustco took no action which created a duty to procure
adequate coverage for Farr. Trustco did not "lull [Farr] into believing" it had adequate
coverage. In fact, Trustco and Farr engaged in no communication whatsoever. Furthermore,
there was no prior course of dealing between Farr and Trustco showing Trustco had "taken
care of [Farr's] needs without consultation in the past." If Farr was concerned about its level
of coverage, Farr or Reed was responsible for conveying that concern to Trustco. As it was,

10

Trustco first learned of Farr's insurance needs on May 23,2003. Reed informed Trustco that
Farr needed coverage that day. Due to the time constraints imposed by Farr and Reed,
Trustco had no opportunity to assess Farr's insurance needs (even assuming Trustco had been
asked to do so). Accordingly, Trustco had no duty to obtain adequate coverage for Farr.
Other jurisdictions have commented more directly on an insurance agent's duty
to obtain adequate coverage. Generally, "although an insurance agent has an obligation to
follow a customer's instructions and procure adequate coverage on the best terms available,
an agent who fulfills this obligation does not have a duty to advise the insured regarding the
adequacy of the coverage, absent a specific agreement to do so or a special relationship with
the customer...." 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 162; Peter v. Schumacher Enterprises, Inc., 22
P.3d 481, 486 (Alaska 2001).
A special relationship may arise in the context of a long-standing relationship
between agent and insured, and where the insured seeks advice or questions the adequacy
of coverage. Trupiano v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 654 N.E. 2d 886, 889 (Ind. App. 1995).
However, "even where an agent has some knowledge that an insured may require additional
insurance, a duty does not arise if the agent and customer had no prior dealings in which the
agent has customarily taken care of the client's needs without consulting him or her." 43
Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 162; Pickens v. Texas Farm Bureau Ins. Companies, 836 S.W. 2d
803, 805 (Tex. App. 1992); see also Martinonis v. Utica Nat. Ins. Group, 840 N.E. 2d 994,
996 (Mass. 2006) (holding that "there is no general duty of an insurance agent to ensure that

11

the insurance policies procured by him provide coverage that is adequate for the needs of the
insured.")
In Murphy v. Kuhn, 682 N.E. 2d 972, 976 (N.Y. 1997) The New York Court
of Appeals summarized some of the policy reasons underlying the rule that insurance agents
ordinarily have no duty to advise customers to obtain additional coverage:
Insurance agents or brokers are not personal financial counselors
and risk managers, approaching guarantor status. . .. Insureds
are in a better position to know their personal assets and abilities
to protect themselves more so than general insurance agents or
brokers, unless the latter are informed and asked to advise and
act.. .. Furthermore, permitting insureds to add such parties to
the liability chain might well open flood gates to even more
complicated and undesirable litigation.
Another reason insurance agents have no general duty to advise customers to
obtain additional coverage is that imposing such a duty "could afford insureds the
opportunity to insure after the loss by merely asserting they would have bought the additional
coverage had it been offered." Neilson v. Davidson, 456 N.W. 2.d 343, 347 (Wise. 1990).
Finally, the Alaska court in Peter v. Schumacher Enterprises, Inc. observed:
An undesirable consequence of imposing such a duty [to advise]
would be that agents would defensively tend to advise their
customers to buy the highest, most comprehensive and
expensive coverages rather than more modest packages that
most people of similar means would find suitable. This could
result in a mis-allocation of personal resources of individual
insureds.
Peter at 486.
There were no prior dealings between Farr and Trustco or Reed and Trustco.
12

Duane Farr never communicated with Trustco before the May 29, 2006 ammonia spill.
Neither Farr nor Reed sought advice from Trustco before Farr's May 29,2003 loss, regarding
the adequacy of Farr's coverage. All communications regarding Farr's insurance coverage
went through Reed. Based on these facts, no special relationship existed between Farr and
Trustco, and Trustco had no duty to advise Farr about the adequacy of its coverage. Farr's
negligence claim against Trustco fails as a matter of law.
B.

Farr's Breach of Contract Claim Fails Because Trustco Did What
it Agreed to Do

In Harris v. Albrecht, the Utah Supreme Court outlined the elements giving rise
to a contract to procure insurance: "a contract to procure insurance may arise when the agent
has definite directions from the insured to consummate a final contract, when the scope,
subject matter, duration, and other elements can be found by implication, and when the
insured gives the agent authority to ascertain some of the essential facts." 86 P.3d at 731
(citations omitted). The court also stated that "previous dealings between the parties are the
strongest and, in most instances, the most definite basis for implying terms of a contract."
Id. at 732.
In the present action, Trustco fulfilled all of the terms of its agreement with
Farr. Farr, through Reed, requested that Trustco (1) serve as its broker of record, and (2)
bind coverage effective May 23, 2003. Trustco accomplished both tasks. Trustco received
no

"definite directions" to evaluate Farr's coverage, nor did Farr give Trustco the

opportunity to ascertain any of the "essential facts" surrounding its coverage. Accordingly,
13

Trustco did not breach any contract with Farr.
Farr contends that Granger's May 23, 2003 personal notes are somehow
representative of Farr's level of insurance coverage. However, Farr's argument relies on a
strained interpretation. Granger's notes state:
Got phone call from Steve Kirchen. "How would you like to
have a $50,000 acct. dropped in your lap?" "It has to be done
today." I stayed in town and got it done. We did [a broker of
record] letter and I talked to [Safeco employee] Chatrice, she
confirmed she got it. I asked her about coverage being bound
and she said it was. I told her to go with all coverages except
auto as they had gone to Farmers with auto.
(R. 2538)
Based on Granger's notes, Farr argues Trustco's request that "all coverages"
be bound on May 23, 2003 means "Farr was entitled to 'all coverages' which are reasonable
to fully insure Farr for the loss it incurred." (Farr brief p. 17). This ignores the fact that the
Farr account had been previously quoted by Safeco through Blackburn Jones, and Trustco
was only requested to bind all coverages which had been previously quoled by Safeco. Farr's
breach of contract cause of action fails because Trustco did everything it was asked to do for
Farr.
When Granger wrote the phrase "all coverages" in his notes, he wasn't binding
blanket coverage for any conceivable loss. Rather, Granger was binding all coverages that
w ere previously quoted to Safeco through Blackburn Jones. There is no evidence otherwise.4
4

There is also no evidence Reed or Farr ever saw Granger's May 23, 2003 personal notes
prior to this litigation Hence, they could not have relied on Granger's "all coverages" notation.
14

C,

Trustco Breached No Fiduciary Duties Owed to Farr
Farr alleges Trustco acted jointly with and as agent for Safeco. (Farr brief, p.

24). It is generally accepted that "an agent of the insurer, who acts within the scope of his
or her authority, for a disclosed company, is not liable to the insured, either in contract or in
tort, unless the agent is deemed the agent for the applicant or insured, such as where the
agent undertakes to procure a policy, but fails to do so. Thus, where the agent's acts are
those of the insurance company, the action must be brought against the company...." 43 Am.
Jur. 2d Insurance § 161. Throughout the course of this litigation. Farr has alleged that
Trustco acted as Safeco's agent. As Safeco's agent, Trustco owed no fiduciary duties to Farr.
Even if Trustco acted as Farr's agent, as opposed to Safeco's, Trustco violated
no fiduciary duties it allegedly owed to Farr. Farr never had any communications with
Trustco, nor did Farr give Trustco any directions regarding its coverage needs. The only
direction Trustco received was to bind the previously-quoted Safeco coverage on May 23,
2003, as instructed by Reed.
As discussed above, an insurance agent's duty to advise a client regarding the
adequacy of coverage generally does not arise until the customer seeks advice or questions
the adequacy of coverage. 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 162; Trupiano v. Cincinnati Ins. Co.,
654 N.E. 2d 886 (Ind. App. 1995). In responding to this argument in the trial court, Farr
conceded that Trustco was not asked to evaluate the adequacy of Farr's coverage:
While Reed may have questioned the adequacy of Farr's
coverage under the expiring Unitrin/Trinity policy, Farr "knew
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I had plenty of insurance covering products..." and, on May 23,
2003, Farr was not seeking advice. Farr knew it was "very
critical" to get coverage: "I had to have coverage, yes."
(R. 3212, emphasis added.) It is undisputed that May 23, 2003 was the first day Trustco had
any involvement in obtaining insurance coverage for Farr. Farr concedes that on May 23,
2003, "Farr was not seeking advice." Rather, Farr was taking whatever steps necessary in
order to obtain coverage:
Farr signed a request for insurance coverage drafted by Trustco
which very clearly defined Trustco's duty/undertaking: 1)
requesting Safeco to "acknowledge Trustco as our exclusive
Broker of Record to handle all the affairs associated in the
writing of our policy" and 2) telling Safeco "we would like to
have coverage bound effective May 23, 2003."
(R. 3213)
In successfully binding the previously-quoted Safeco coverage, Trustco timely
accomplished everything it was asked to do for Farr. For that reason alone, Trustco could
not have breached any fiduciary duty it may have owed to Farr.
D.
Farr's Equitable Estoppel Claim Based Entirely on Reed's
Commitment Fails as to Trustco
Farr's equitable estoppel claim is based on Reed's alleged "commitment" to
Farr:
50. The affirmative representations that were made and given
by Reed, acting for and on behalf of the Primary Defendants,
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that are referred to in paragraph 21 above [Reed's Commitment]
were reasonably relied upon by plaintiff. [TAC at ^ 50]
To prevail on its equitable estoppel claim, Farr must prove: "1) an admission, statement, or
act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, 2) action by the other party on the faith
of such admission, statement, or act, and 3) injury to such party resulting from allowing the
first party to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or act." Celebrity Club, Inc.
v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'«., 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979). Farr cannot meet these
elements with respect to Trustco. Trustco did not make any statement to Farr. Reed's
statements are insufficient because, as discussed below, Reed did not have authority and was
not acting as an agent of Trustco when the alleged statements were made. Thus, the first
element for an estoppel claim cannot be satisfied.
Additionally, the reliance element cannot be satisfied as to Trustco, given that
Duane Farr had no understanding of Trustco's role. Mr. Farr claims he relied solely on Reed,
and simply did what Reed told him to do. Meanwhile Trustco obtained what it was asked
to obtain: the previously-quoted Safeco coverage. Thus, Farr cannot establish it relied on any
representation by Trustco regarding the scope and amount of coverage of the previouslyquoted Safeco policy.
II.

REED WAS NOT TRUSTCO'S SUBAGENT
In an attempt to impute Reed's actions to Trustco, Farr argues, without

analysis, that "Reed was authorized by Trustco to act on its behalf and was subject to
Trustco's control in relation to the Farr transaction. Consequently, an agency relationship
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was entered into between Trustco and Reed . . . . When viewed in a light most favorable to
Farr, the facts establish that Trustco authorized Reed to act on its behalf in relation to the Farr
insurance coverage." (Farr brief, p. 26). In order to support this argument, Farr appears to
rely solely on Reed's involvement in obtaining a signature for the May 23, 2003 broker of
record letter, Reed's collection of Farr's premium check, and the fact Reed provided certain
information Safeco requested in connection with binding the previously-quoted Safeco
coverage. (Farr brief, p. 26)
Farr claims the foregoing facts demonstrate an agent-subagent relationship
between Trustco and Reed, citing Phillips v. JCMDevelopment Corporation, 666 P.2d 876
(Utah 1983). In Phillips, the court applied Section 406 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency in analyzing the duties an agent owes to its principal for the conduct of a subagent.
But Farr's duty argument ignores an important threshold determination: how an agentsubagent relationship is formed.
Section 5 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines a subagent as "a
person appointed by an agent empowered to do so, to perform functions undertaken by the
agent for the principal, but for whose conduct the agent agrees with the principal to be
primarily responsible." Comment D to Subsection 5 explains:
A subagent performing acts which the appointing agent has
authorized him to perform in accordance with an authorization
from the principal is an agent of the principal and affects the
relations of the principal to third persons as fully as if the
appointing agent had done such acts. . . . The subagent is also
the agent of the appointing agent, with power to subject the
18

appointing agent to liability to the principal for his defaults in
the performance of the principal's business, and to third persons
for his acts within the scope of his authority or employment.
Likewise, the appointing agent has the same rights and liabilities
with respect to the subject as any other principal as to his agent.

Id, internal citations omitted.
This court has explained that normally the question of whether an agency
relationship exists is one of fact, which the court reviews for an abuse of discretion.
However, where the evidence as to the agent's authority is undisputed, or different
reasonable, logical inferences may not be drawn therefrom, the question of agency is one of
law. Mecham Consolidated Oil and Transport v. Consolidated Oil & Transportation, Inc.,
53 P.3d 479, 482 (Ut. App. 2002). In order to be an agent a person must be authorized by
another to act on his behalf, and subject to his control. Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah,
970 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1998).
The following facts remain undisputed: Trustco had no involvement in
obtaining insurance coverage for Farr prior to May 23, 2003, the day the broker of record
letter was signed by Farr. (R. 1667, 2538). Prior to Trustco's involvement, Duane Farr
spent approximately an hour with Reed during one of their meetings, going over things Farr
needed. Duane Farr used the previous year's Trinity policy to make sure he had all of Farr's
insurance needs covered. (R. 1696-97) On May 14, 2003, "Reed gave Duane Farr a
Reed/Farmers Insurance Proposal." (R. 2348-2368) However, as of May 23, 2003, Duane
Farr understood that "Farmers was not going to insure that part of the policy and that [Reed]
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had to get it from somebody else. And Trustco was the people that [Reed] had gone to. And
[Reed] wanted to make sure that I was okay on having Trustco handle it." (R. 1716-18)
Before deciding to go with Trustco, Reed checked with Duane Farr in order
to "make sure" it was okay. Reed's involvement in executing the broker of record letter and
collecting the premium check were completed in furtherance of Farr's explicit direction that
Trustco bind coverage on May 23, 2003. These facts show that Reed was not Trustco's
subagent. Reed met with Duane Farr regarding Farr's insurance needs. Reed submitted
proposals to several insurance agencies prior to contacting Trustco on May 23, 2003. When
Reed was unable to obtain insurance coverage from other providers, Reed worked to "get it
from somebody else." Farr's attempt to characterize Reed as Trustco's subagent, and thereby
impute his actions to Trustco, fails as a matter of law.
Farr asks rhetorically "if Reed was not acting on behalf of Trustco, how did
Trustco obtain Farr's account?" (Farr brief, p. 28). Farr answers this question on the next
page of its brief: "Trustco was thus obviously acting exactly as expected of an insurance
producer in seeking to bind and in binding coverage for Farr, a commercial insurance
customer which happened to have been referred to Trustco by Kirchen and Reed." (Farr
brief, p. 29, emphasis added).
Kirchen referred the Farr account to Trustco as a courtesy to Reed. Trustco
was asked to substitute as broker of record for previously-quoted Safeco coverage. In
furtherance of that effort, Reed obtained Farr's signature on the May 23, 2003 broker of
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record letter and collected Farr's premium check. No agent-subagent or principal-agent
relationship existed between Trustco and Reed. Reed simply performed ministerial functions
in transmitting a request to bind previously-quoted coverage, and then furnishing information
requested by Safeco after the May 23, 2003 oral binder. Reed's involvement in obtaining
Farr's signature on the broker of record letter and collecting Farr's premium check were
similar ministerial acts, and do not support Farr's claim that Reed acted as Trustco's
subagent. See e.g. Vinav. Jefferson Insurance Co. of New York, 7'61 P.2d 581, 586 (Ut. App.
1988) (performance of ministerial acts did not support plaintiffs claim of agency).
CONCLUSION
Trustco did what it was asked to do: bind the previously-quoted

Safeco

coverage on May 23, 2003. Moreover, Reed was not Trustco's subagent, and Trustco is not
responsible for any of Reed's alleged acts or omissions. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling
granting Trustco's Motion for Summary Judgment should be affirmed.
DATED this \A_ day of March, 2008.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK
GARY T. WIGHT
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Trustco, Inc.
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH ~"
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENTASAEL FARR & SONS COMPANY, a
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
reciprocal or'inter-insurance
exchange; ANDREW L. REED;
TRUSTCO, INC., a corporation;
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY, a
corporation; AMERICAN STATES
INSURANCE CO., a corporation;
HARTFORD STEAM BOILER
INSPECTION AND INSURANCE CO., a
corporation; STEPHEN D. KIRCHEN;
CENTRAL BONDS & INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC., a corporation;
CENTRAL BONDS AND INSURANCE
COMPANY INCORPORATED, a
corporation; AUTO-OWNERS
INSURANCE COMPANY, a
corporation; BLACKBURN JONES
COMPANY, a corporation; E. KENT
JONES; TRINITY UNIVERSAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF KANSAS,
INC., a corporation; TRINITY
UNIVERSAL INSURANCE CO., a
corporation; and UNITRIN PROPERTY
& CASUALTY INSURANCE GROUP, a
corporation or common enterprise,

RULING
CASE NO. 040913675
JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER

Defendants.
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f

On May 4,2007, the Court heard oral arguments on: (1) Defendant Hartford Steam
Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company's

Motion For Summary Judgment; (2)

Defendant Safeco insurance Company of Amenca and American States Insurance
Company's Motion For Summary Judgment; and (3) Plaintiff Asae! Farr's Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment against defendants Hartford and Safeco.
On May 7, 2007, the Court heard oral arguments on the remaining motions,
including: (1) Plaintiff Asael Farr's Motion For Leave To File Fourth Amended Complaint;
(2) Plaintiff Asaei Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On Apportionment; (3)
Plaintiff Asael Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendants Safeco
Insurance Company, American States Insurance CoM Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and
Insurance Co., Andrew L Reed, and Trustco inc. On Liability Issues; (4) Defendant Auto
Owners Insurance Company's Motion For Summary Judgment: (5) Defendant Trustco's
Motion For Summary Judgment; (6) Defendants Stephen D. Kirchen, Central Bonds &
Insurance Agency Inc., and Central Bonds & Insurance Company Incorporated's Motion
For Summary Judgment; and (7) Defendants Truck Insurance Exchange and Andrew
Reed's Motion For Summary Judgment. At the conclusion of the May 7m hearing the Court
took all matters under advisement except for plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on
apportionment which the Court indicated it would reserve until, if necessary, the time of
trial.
Having thoroughly reviewed the parties' briefing, arguments and relevant legal
authorities, the Court now rules as stated herein.
I. Background
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This case contains a somewhat lengthy and relatively complex factual background
For that reason, a brief synopsis of the undisputed facts is warranted
Plaintiff Asael Farr & Sons Company ("Farr") is a locally based ice cream
manufactureranddistnbutorin operation since incorporation in 1920 Farr's current lawsuit
stems from an incident which occurred on May 29, 2003, at the company's cold storage
warehouse located in Salt Lake City, Utah

On that date an electric condenser fan

accidentally sheared off its mount and severed an ammonia line, thereby releasing
ammonia and contaminating plaintiffs product stored at the warehouse As of November
7, 2003 Farr calculated damages exceeding $1,500,000 00.
immediately after the accident, Farr notified its insurer, American States Insurance
Company ("American States"), of the loss

Pursuant to the Equipment Breakdown

Coverage portion of the policy, American States paid Farr $25,000 00- -the policy limit for
ammonia contamination

Finding coverage insufficient for the loss suffered, Farr filed its

current action against the fifteen named defendants alleging causes of action against each
for breach of contract, bad faith, negligence, and promissory estoppel
From May 14,2002, to May 14, 2003, Plaintiff Asael Farr & Sons Farr was insured
for commercial property and liability insurance through Unitnn Property & Casualty Group
('Unitnn")

In March 2003, Unitrm's subsidiary, Trinity Universal Insurance, advised Farr

that its policy would not be renewed beyond the expiration date Under Fair's Unitnn policy
Equipment Breakdown Coverage for the loss of perishable goods due to contamination
was subject to a $25,000 liability limit
Upon learning of Unitrm's non-renewal, Farr began working with its insurance agent
Andrew Reed ('Reed"), a captive agent of Truckers Insurance Exchange/Farmers
3

Insurance Group ("Farmers"), in order to obtain comprehensive property and liability
coverage. Thereafter, Farmers' declined coverage on the Farr policy, and Reed began
contacting other agents and insurers. In March 2003, Reed contacted Steven Kirchen
("Ktrchen") of Central Bonds & Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Central Bonds"). At Reed's
request, Kirchen contacted other agents and insurers and eventually obtained a bid from
Auto Owners Insurance Company ("Auto Owners"). Auto Owners indicated, however, that
any writing on the Farr policy was subject to office approval and additional

insurer

information on items such as loss history and property valuations.
On May 14, 2003, Farr delivered a check to Auto Owners in the amount of
$7,838.83 for property, liability and equipment breakdown coverages. Shortly thereafter,
Auto Owners' underwriting department declined coverage on the Farr account and returned
the Farr's uncashed check.
On May 23, 2003, in a continued attempt to obtain coverage, Kirchen put Reed in
contact with Troy Granger of Trustco Inc. ('Trustco"). Relying upon Reed's instructions,
Farr appointed Trustco as its Broker of Record, thereby giving Trustco the authority
necessary to handle affairs associated with writing the Farr policy.

Shortly thereafter,

Trustco placed Farr's coverage with American States, an affiliate of Safeco Insurance
Company ("Safeco") and American States/Safeco issued Farr a policy active from May 23,
2003 to May 23, 2004.
A short six days later, on May 29,2004, the ammonia accident occurred at the Farr
warehouse.
On May 31,2005, Farrfiled its Third Amended Complaint against Andrew Reed and
a group Farr labeled as "Primary Defendants," consisting of:
4

Truckers' Insurance

Exchange, Trustco, Safeco, American States Insurance, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection
and Insurance Co., Steve Kirchen, Central Bonds and Insurance Incorporated and Auto
Owners Insurance. Each of Farr's causes of action stem from the so-called "Reed's
Commitment" in which Farr alleges that Reed bound the primary defendants for ail of Farr's
insurable risks. Specifically, Fair claims on and before May 14, 2003, Andrew Reed,
while acting both for himself and as the duly authorized agent for TIE,
Trustco, Safeco, American, Hartford, Kirchen, Central Agency,
Central Bonds and Auto Owners ("Primary Defendants") had received
payment for and affirmatively represented to plaintiff: (a) that
the Primary Defendants had duly bound and provided plaintiff with all
necessary and appropriate insurance coverage for al! of plaintiff's
significant insurable risks, including all insurable risks related to Plaintiff's
Products, and (b) that the Primary Defendants, and each, of them had
agreed, committed, and become jointly obligated to provide plaintiff
with all such necessary, available and appropriate insurance
coverage for all of Plaintiffs Products and all of plaintiffs significant
insurable risks ("Reeds Commitment") effective May 14, 2003.

Third Amended Complaint fl 21.

ii. Pending Motions
A. Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Leave To File Fourth Amended Complaint
Farr's Motion For Leave To File Fourth Amended Complaint seeks to join Travelers
Indemnity Company/Travelers Boiler Express ("Travelers") as a party to this action. In
support of its motion, Farr contends that through discovery and the deposition of Stephen
Kirchen, Farr learned that Travelers bound insurance coverage for ail or a portion of the
damages for which it seeks relief. Defendants, Auto Owners Insurance Company, Stephen
Kirchen, Central Bonds & Insurance Agency Inc. and Central Bonds And Insurance
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Company Incorporated oppose amendment, arguing that adding Travelers as a party
would be futile
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to amend should be "freely
given when justice so requires." Justice, however, does not require that leave be given
"if doing so would be futile." IHC v Jensen 2003 UT 51, H 139, 82 P.3d 1076, citing,
Benton v Adams 56 P.3d 81, 86 (Colo 2002) (internal citations omitted)),
A reading of Stephen Kirchen's deposition, reveals that Kirchen did not represent
that Travelers bound coverage. Instead, Kirchen testified that Travelers had merely issued
a spoilage and equipment breakdown quote which was contingent upon Farr's submission
of additional information (e.g. mortgages, loss payees, address/contact names for
inspection). Stephen Kirchen Deposition, at 66-67. None of the additional information
was ever provided Moreover, Travelers' quote was a supplement to a potential policy from
Auto Owners. Kirchen Deposition at 66. As a result, when Auto-Owners declined to write
coverage for Farr, the Travelers portion of the proposed coverage was declined as well.
Kirchen Deposition at 68.
Concluding that Kirchen's testimony does not support plaintiffs assertion that
Travelers bound Farr's coverage, the Court finds that amendment would be futile and
denies plaintiffs Motion To Amend. Accordingly, Farr's Third Amended Complaint shall
be the operative complaint for consideration of all remaining motions and to that extent the
Court will not address Farr's "new" claims involving allegations of an oral binder and policy
ambiguity.
B. Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Hartford
And Defendant Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Co.'s
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Motion For Summary Judgment
On December 31,2000, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company
("Hartford") entered into a reinsurance agreement with Safeco Insurance Company of
America ("Safeco"), under which Hartford agreed to reinsure 100% of the Equipment
Breakdown liability policies issued by Safeco and its affiliates. At the time of the ammonia
accident at Farr's storage warehouse, American States, an affiliate of Safeco, was Farr's
insurer. Apparently in its role as reinsurer for Safeco, Farr now brings claims against
Hartford for breach of contract, negligence, bad faith and equitable estoppel. The basis
for each of Farr's causes of action is "Reed's Commitment"—the claim that Andrew Reed,
while acting as a "duly authorized agent" for Hartford, represented to plaintiff that Hartford
bound coverage for all of FarrJs products and insurable risks. Third Amended Complaint,
at 11 21.
Farr has no contractual relationship with Hartford. As a result, all of Farr's causes
of action against defendant stem from an alleged agency relationship between Reed and
Hartford under which Reed, as Hartford's agent, acted on behalf of and subject to
Hartford's control. Despite Farr's theory, the record contains no evidence of an agency
relationship between Reed and Hartford. To be an agent, a person umust be authorized
by another to 'act on his behalf and subject to his control/" Gildea v Guardian Title Co. of
Utah 970 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1998) {citing, Restatement (Second) of Agency §1
(1958)). Here, it is undisputed that Andrew Reed was a captive agent of the Farmers
Group of Insurance Companies, and not an employee of Hartford.

Andrew Reed

Deposition, at 397-98. Moreover, Andrew Reed specifically testified that he did not have
an agency contract with Hartford and did not have any authority to act on Hartford's behalf.
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Reed Deposition, at 398. Absent evidence of an agency relationship, Farr's claims against
Hartford for breach of contract, bad faith, negligence and estoppel all fail.
Accordingly, Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Hartford is
denied and Hartford's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted.
C. Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Kirchen and Central
Bonds & Insurance Agency Inc., and Central Bonds & Insurance
Company Incorporated And Defendants Stephen Kirchen, Central
Bonds & Insurance Agency Inc., and Central Bonds & Insurance
Company Incorporated's Motion For Summary Judgment
As an initial matter, in its opposition to defendants' motion, Farr fails to effectively
dispute and support with contrary evidence detendant Central Bonds and Insurance
Company Incorporated's claim that it had no involvement in the events at issue in this
litigation. Accordingly, defendant Central Bonds and Insurance Company Inc.'s Motion For
Summary Judgment is granted.
Defendant Stephen Kirchen ("Kirchen") was employed as an insurance agent by
defendant Centra! Bonds and Insurance Agency ("Central Bonds"). Sometime in March
2003, Andrew Reed contacted Kirchen and requested his assistance in placing the Farr
account. At Reed's request, Kirchen contacted several insurance companies including
Auto-Owners Insurance Company. After Auto Owners' declined Farr's coverage, Kirchen
put Reed in touch with Trustco Insurance Inc. and its agent Troy Granger. Thereafter,
Kirchen and Central Bonds had no further involvement with the Farr account.
The basis for each of Farr's causes of action against Kirchen and Central Bonds is
"Reed's CommitmentMhe claim that Andrew Reed 5 while acting as the "duly authorized
agent" for. Kirchen and Central Bonds, represented to Farr that Central Bonds, by and
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through Kirchen, bound coverage for all of Farr's products, and insurable risks. Third
Amended Complaint, a! ]} 7 I!.
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of defendant Trustco, Inc ("Trustco"). On May 23,2003, Trustco successfully bound Farr's
property, liability and equipment breakdown coverage with Safeco/American States
Insurance ("American States") through a policy active from May 23,2003, through May 23,
2004. Six days later, on May 29, 2003, the ammonia accident occurred at the Farr
warehouse.
Farr's American States policy contained a $25,000.00 Equipment Breakdown
Coverage provision for the loss of perishable goods due to contamination from the release
of ammonia. Consequently, after the ammonia leak at Farr cold storage warehouse,
American States paid Farr the policy limit.
The basis for each of Farr's causes of action against American States is "Reed's
Commitment"-the claim that Andrew Reed, while acting as the "duly authorized agent' for
American States represented that American States bound coverage on all of plaintiffs
products and insurable risks. Third Amended Complaint at ^ff 21.
In Utah, in order to be an agent a person "must be authorized by another to 'act on
his behalf and subject to his control." Gildea v Guardian Title Co. of Utah 970 P.2d 1265,
1269 (Utah 1989) {citing, Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958)) . Here, it is
undisputed that Reed was not authorized to act on behalf of American States. Andrew
Reed Deposition at 519-520. Reed had no authority to bind American States and could
not act as an agent on behatf o1 American States. Absent any such relationship, p'lamWH's
breach of contract, negligence, bad faith, and estoppel claims fail.
As Farr's actual insurer, it is important to note that plaintiff does state what duty it
asserts as the basis for its negligence claim. However, there is no authority in support of
Farr's claim that an insurance company, absent some specific directive, has an obligation
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to evaluate and ascertain the insurable risks of each insured. Finally, as tn Farr's estoppel
claim, despit
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ultimately p:- >•
Plaintiff Farr's Motioi \ For Partial Summary Judgment is denied and Defendants
Safeco/American States' Motion F' :>i Si in 11 i lai \ h i igi: i \e i it is gi am ited.
Di^;~+:*f p a r r j s Motion For Partial Sumn tat y Ji idgment Against Auto
Insurance Company & Auto Owners Insurance Company's
or Summary Judgment
in earlv May 2003, Stephen Kirchen via use of Auto Owners 1 computer mlini|

p

[

:• r

•

.,: .< coverage.. On May 13,2003, Kircf len

provided the rate information to Auto Owners and underwriting informed him that fir sal
dnnki in (in tln< < i •« «i II|*« v\ " i(Hilnn|f ni ii| >II I in

iftice approval and additional

application information.
s

• - • - '•

.p . e a che*.-. u\ •:. ,; , .

payable to Auto Owners for property, liability and equipment breakdown coverage. Several
days later, 'i

:

n

-*• '

the

home office declined coverage on the Farr account, f- arrs uncashed check made payable
to Owners was returned to Farr,
i I ie basis for all of Fai i "s causes of action against ' y. Owners is *"w->.*
Commitment—the claim that Andrew Reed, while acting
fi

!

-*. • J

J ito Ovi ners.represei ited that Auto Owners had bound coverage for all of Farr's products

and insurable risks.,,. Third Amended Complaint •,**

1.

I .in has no contr actual relationship wit! i Auto Owners, As a result, all of Farr's
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causes of action against the defendant stern from an alleged agency relationship between
Reed and Auto Owners under which Reed, as Auto Owners' agent, acted on behalf of and
subject to Auto Owners' control. Despite Farr's theory, the record contains no evidence
of an agency relationship between Auto Owners and Reed,

In Utah, in order to be an

agent a person "must be authorized by another to 'act on his behalf and subject to his
control/" Gildea v Guardian Title Co. of Utah 970 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1989) (citing,
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958)). Here, it is undisputed that Andrew Reed
was not authorized to act on behalf of Auto Owners. In his deposition Reed specifically
states that he was not an agent of Auto Owners and never had authority to represent the
company.

Andrew Reed Deposition, at 351-52.

Absent evidence of an agency

relationship, Farr's claims against Auto Owners for breach of contract, bad faith,
negligence and estoppel must fail.
Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment against Auto Owners is
denied, and defendant Auto Owners Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
F,

Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Truck
insurance Exchange and Andrew Reed & Truck Insurance Exchange
and Andrew Reed's Motion For Summary Judgment
1. Truck Insurance Exchange/Farmers Insurance

As with the other defendants, Farr asserts causes of action against Truck Insurance
Exchange (Farmers lnsurance/nFarmersn) for breach of contract, bad faith, negligence and
equitable estoppel. Distinguishing Farmers from the other primary defendants, however,
is the fact that Andrew Reed was a captive agent of Farmers insurance. As Farmers'
agent, Farr claims that Reed represented that Farmers "duly bound and provided plaintiff
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with-all necessary and appropriate insurance coverage for all of plaintiff s significant

Despite the existence of an agency relationship between Farmers and Reed, it is
undisputed that 5

'

,

_>ness, and tl lat as early

as May 23, 200*3, rarr Knew that harrners declined coverane Dexter Farr Deposition, at
158-59. Th

" > • • •

-

:

,i mers was solely lim;;t:.l to

Reed's attempt to place Farr's coverage with Farmers; once Farmers declined, Reed was
no longer Farmer's ~

: . ^:;jmpts to secure

coverage through u\w\ insures

• n^s, as to its contr -set bfjsc - claims Farr admits it did

not have ^ ^ ^ a u wan

-

-.

\

acts to the

contrary. Additionally, in si ipport of its estoppel claim Farr has not provided any evidence
of an admission statement or act inconsisfpni vith if-inning'nIn invifn

i i'uvcidye prior

to the accidei;:. ; ;; ^ ; i y , . arr's negligence claim aiso fails because plaintiff fails to establish
any c Jtv thst Farmo^' rM.v-?d tn p^rr and did not fi jlfill,
n'

~. . i>-.-*

Exchange/Farmers
[ /change/I <JI ima•.

:

-

i-artia! Summar y Judgment Against ""'uc> : r-oinnce
ai id

Dof*-r.

^Mrgnc^

^nied

^ ^ .„t, ; ^ L , ^ .

,, wummary Judgment is granted.

J" Am how Poi.nl
t-Sasei1 M| '.I " ]

"" od's a

vement with the Farr account, the parties'

motions must be considered in sompwhni different posture than the r*»
I HI I'S \\n\w\y\' \\\ ,ii tiun

•*.-*

.

- jntract against Reed is not - . w ;ne cat;t) of

Harris v Albrecht a case of whether a contract of insurance exists.-2004 UT '
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the issue is whether the coverage obtained by Reed was sufficient to meet plaintiffs
needs, or whether Reed contracted for adequate coverage of all significant insurable risks.
Third Amended Complaint ^ 27.

Albrecht is, however, helpful insofar as it addresses

basic contract principles relevant to insurance contracts, including the rule that an agent
must have definite directions from the insured as to the type and amount of coverage
needed in order to establish the requisite meeting of the minds. Albrecht at fi11 (finding,
failure to procure insurance does not arise unless agent has "definite directions from the
insured to consummate a final contract")

In the instant case the undisputed facts

establish that Reed obtained a policy of insurance containing coverage similar to Farr's
prior policy with Unitrin, and that Farr did not provide Reed with any specific direction to
acquire additional coverage beyond that previous obtained. In fact to the contrary, the
evidence reveals that Farr specifically rejected Reed's suggestion to increase Farr's
inventory coverage Dexter Farr Deposition at 102-103. A blanket request for adequate
coverage and a specific rejection of increased spoilage coverage is inadequate to establish
any contract or commitment on the part of Reed to unilaterally procure an insurance policy
for Farr that contained coverage beyond their specifications. Thus, based upon the
undisputed facts, there is no evidence to support a claim for breach of contract or bad faith
since Reed performed his agreement with Farr and obtained a policy of insurance
consistent with Farr's request.
With respect to plaintiffs estoppel claim, there is no evidence in the record to show
that Reed misrepresented the state of the Farr's insurance coverage. While Farr argues
that Reed represented coverage was in place and failed to explain the terms of the policy,
neither allegation amounts to a misrepresentation. First, the statement by Reed that
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coverage was in place was undisputedly true; a policy was in place prior to the accident.
Second, 1h " amount

rdsonaoie

••\--^i

feiianc-

.-

«:

?ip\

- ;-_,;

;;neir coverage does not

-virienr, > supporting claims of

misrepresentation L ~

ils.

Finally, as to tlie cause of action for negligence, Reed clearly hn«i ^ Hntv ?-• ^ -o>r
insurance coverage consistent will i II r Friu ,,: "xpi essed \ equc

. .*. ^;\ ,., K.^- .•.;;..

assertion, there was no breach of this cuty since Reed, absent any specific instruction from
Farr,.obtained coverage consistent

'-ere • no

duty between Reed and Farr that requires-Reed to insist on procuring a coverage limit
greater than that which Farr requested. ''IUIII-HHII 1 ,

'-'ill. I. • »y > I !• pi untitl:; argument

I hut Reed had j duty to communicate the "coverage gap" to f- arrp rhe record indicates that
Reed did so when he suggested additional coverage, Dexter Fai i Deposition »il. I "J J I U',1.
, . - ;....

*.i.;s it did not understand the differences in policy coverage

does not negate the h r t th^t ^APM did communicate *1'**- ••*

r . < ••

uppons . . i , . s argument that Reed misrepresented the state of
coverage and the undisputed facts demonstrate there was no fni "<» m i , y v\ .n

.i

perfninifn i!uih ' , J I pijiiititi • insurance agent. Accordingly, «-£i"'s claim for negligence
is denied.,
i uiniril r - * rr < hi i

i i i min •ujniiu.^ y augment Against Andrew Reed is

denied and Andrew Reed's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted.
" -l;aintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Truster} &
Defendant Trustco's Motion For Summary Judgment
i rustco's involvement in this matter stems from a May 23, 2003, letter •>•** • <•
Duane Farr nppMinlinq Tiu'ilu' H^ I HII ^ Hn«h;t of Record
15

In its capacity as Broker,

Trustco, by and through Troy Granger, placed Farr's coverage with American States; the
policy in place at the time of the ammonia accident.
Limiting the allegations against Trustco to those contained in the Third Amended
Complaint, all causes of action against Trustco stem from "Reed's Commitmenf-the claim
that Andrew Reed, while acting as a "duly authorized agent" for Trustco, represented that
Trustco bound coverage for all of Farr's products and insurable risks. Third Amended
Complaint, at IT 21.
Similar to the other defendants, the Court concludes there is no evidence of an
agency relationship between Reed and Trustco. in Utah, to be an agent a person "must
be authorized by another to 'act on his behalf and subject to his control'" Gildeav Guardian
Title Co. of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1998)(c/f/ng, Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 1 (1958)). While Farr relies upon Reed's involvement in obtaining a signature
for Trustco to act as Broker of Record letter and Reed's collection of a premium as
evidence of an agency relationship, such evidence actually supports the existence of an
agency relationship between Reed and Farr since it is undisputed that all information
regarding Farr's insurance needs were communicated to Trustco by Reed.
As to plaintiffs1 contract based claims, the evidence reflects that Trustco fulfilled all
of the terms of its agreement with Farr by serving as its broker of record and binding
coverage with Safeco/American States effective May 23, 2003. Additionally, there is no
evidence of an admission, statement or act inconsistent with Trustco's role as broker.
Similarly, Farr's negligence claim also fails because there is no evidence that Trustco had
a duty to determine whether the amount of coverage in the Safeco/American States policy
was sufficient to meets plaintiffs needs.
16
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For these reasons p'qsntit-f Kjrr's Motion

'

•"

$t

1 iiuslco .: : „ .. JG, .J..U ^ u , . . i j i i . u : rustco's Motiui - o ' oumrr. -,ry Judgment ib yrantoa

III. Conclusion
In -^-. ...«s.u;., plaintiff is ui i able to support its allegationsagainst the defendants as
stated in Farr's Third Amended r.-vnpM-.:
bet-"'-

.

.:

.

7

n-;-: absence c1

j v veiendanfs t legates

telationsliip
%t

r* eiie-r c

representations Reed aib-cpdiy made on the insurers' behalf. '•' **•
RHPCI

any
1/

ininscll, I'he MM, uid indicates his suggestions to alter coverage from that established

under Farr's prior policy was rejected and Reed has no duty to obtain \ nveraip bevond
tlmlt h:'i,|ijf; id 11 If i

|||i

idbUlud.

This Ruling will stand as the-Order of the Court" wanting and denyinq tho motinn*.
as '

.. < j to be prepared by c o u n s e l

B* : HE COURT:

(Zh^^^Q^S^S^
SANDRA N. PEULER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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